Relocating the British subject: ethnographic encounters with identity politics and nationalism during the 2014 Scottish independence referendum by Smith, Alexander Thomas T.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/104534                             
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Chapter	3	
 
Relocating the British subject; ethnographic encounters with identity politics and 
nationalism during the 2014 Scottish independence referendum 
 
Alexander Thomas T. Smith 
 
Abstract 
In this article, I use an ethnographic encounter in the aftermath of the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum to explore questions of identity and nationalism in Scotland.  
During that encounter, I was confronted by my own, sometimes contradictory, thoughts 
and feelings about Britain, Britishness and Scotland.  Taking inspiration from a genre of 
social scientific writing called ‘ethnographic memoir,’ the rest of the article is my 
attempt to work through, and make sense of, those thoughts and feelings.  I do so by 
drawing on the work of both social anthropologists and sociologists who have written 
about identity, nationalism and legacies of empire in the UK. Following particularly the 
work of the social anthropologist Georgie Wemyss, who argues that contemporary 
discourses around ‘Britain’ legitimate what she calls ‘the invisible empire,’ I suggest 
that affirmations of Britain during the independence referendum helped empower an 
insidious, but largely taken for granted, discourse of imperial nationalism.  This insight 
allows me to locate the source of my own disenchantment with the identity label 
‘British.’  I then conclude by considering some of the wider implications this might 
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have for a sub-discipline that calls itself the Anthropology of Britain. 
 
Keywords 
Scotland, Britishness/British Empire, nationalism, identity, ethnographic memoir, 
biography  
 
Introduction 
Identity and nationalism are rarely questions of the head or the heart alone.  This is as 
true for social anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists trying to make 
sense of identity politics in varied historical and socio-political contexts as it is for our 
ethnographic subjects and the institutions and social groups we study.  This article 
represents my own efforts to reconcile contradictory commitments of my head and my 
heart in relation to these questions.  In doing so, I draw inspiration from scholars writing 
in the tradition of ethnographic memoir, a genre of social scientific and literary writing 
closely allied to ethnography (see, for examples, Anderson, 2005; and Prahlad 2005).  I 
do this deliberately, to highlight my ambiguous relationship to a former field site in 
which I carried out anthropological research on Scottish politics but in which I continue 
to live.  Put simply, the memoir I share here is shaped in significant part by my own 
ethnographic immersion in a place that once seemed ‘foreign’ to me but which I now 
call home.  When I explore identity in relation to Scotland and the UK, I am asking 
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questions that, for me, are at the same time ethnographic and personal.  This is not to 
equate the latter with the former.  Rather, I turn to ethnographic memoir as a means of 
foregrounding both the biographical and reflexive dimensions of these questions.  In so 
doing, I further the aims of this volume to draw on insights based on previous fine-
grained ethnographic research as well as my own recent personal engagement in a local 
community to challenge stereotypes of Scottish nationalism and ‘Britishness’ in 
Scotland.  This speaks to the interdisciplinary mission of social anthropology and how it 
can contribute to sociological analysis. 
 In this article, I explore the following puzzle: how did I, over the course of the 
two years leading up the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, change from a voter 
who initially assumed he would support keeping Scotland within the UK to a reluctant 
supporter of the ‘Yes’ campaign?  I suggest the key to understanding how my views 
changed resulted from my growing disenchantment with identity claims made in 
support of Britain and Britishness.  As someone who was born and raised in Australia 
but now holds dual citizenship between my country of birth and the UK, I had not 
anticipated my political transformation on the question of Scottish independence.  I had 
previously identified as ‘British,’ believing the label to be inclusive and encompassing 
of the national identities and personal histories of Commonwealth citizens and others.  
As the referendum neared and the campaign grew more politically heated, I started to 
question the efficacy of my assumed, ‘British’ identity.  This article is my attempt to 
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make sense of that process of disenchantment, intellectually and personally. 
 How my feelings of belonging and identity changed might also reflect shifts in my 
personal and professional locations within the UK, in relation to my former field site, a 
market town in southern Scotland called Dumfries.  Thinking about this calls for 
attention to what the anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson once called 
‘location work’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997), which challenges anthropologists and 
other scholars to think about questions of their own institutional, political and social 
locations in relation to their research subjects.  I first came to Dumfries as a PhD student 
carrying out anthropological fieldwork, which became a study of the Scottish 
Conservative Party that I later published as an ethnographic monograph (see Smith, 
2011). Since then, I have not conducted further ethnographic research in Scotland, 
though I settled in Dumfries and have been active in the local community.  In the 
vernacular of social anthropology, I had ‘gone native.’  At the time of the referendum 
on Scottish independence, I chaired the Loreburn Community Council, an elected body 
that represents town centre residents.  I also sat on the Local Authority’s Sub-
Committee administering the Dumfries Common Good Fund and was a Founding 
Member of the Loreburn Hall Trust.   
 While sometimes conscious of my status as an ‘incomer’ (cf. Edwards, 2000), the 
fact that my father-in-law was a local Labour Party councilor at the time conferred upon 
me a degree of political capital in the wider community.  In addition, my community 
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activism in Dumfries proceeded alongside my academic career, firstly as a social 
anthropologist but then, later, as a sociologist who working at an English University.  
Every week, during term time, I commute south, leaving behind my former field site for 
my institutional ‘home’ in the West Midlands, a journey that I often felt mimicked the 
tensions between ‘home’ and ‘field’ that empower anthropological research practice 
(see Gupta and Ferguson, 1999).  Combined with my ‘embeddedness’ in local 
connections of people and place, in which I remained ensnared after I finished my 
fieldwork in Dumfries in 2003, I felt that I retained an ethnographer’s sensibility in 
relation to questions of identity and nationalism in Scottish politics. 
 I begin with an ethnographic encounter, a conversation with my father-in-law in 
the days following the referendum.  I describe this conversation as ‘ethnographic’ 
because it brought to the surface complicated feelings I had about the referendum result.  
This surprised me, given that through the campaign I had convinced myself I was an 
agnostic on the question of Scotland’s constitutional future, within or outside the UK.  I 
then seek to put these feelings in context, historically, politically and sociologically.  I 
proceed in four parts.  After providing a brief overview of the two years leading up to 
the referendum, noting the key political events that shaped the debate and its aftermath, 
I consider how the meaning and nature of nationalism in general – and Scottish 
nationalism, in particular – was contested during the campaign.  I then argue that 
critiques of ‘narrow nationalism’ deployed by ‘Better Together’ campaigners and other 
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advocates for a United Kingdom helped empower a seemingly benign, inclusive 
narrative of ‘Britain’ and ‘Britishness,’ which was proposed as a ‘common sense’ 
alternative to Scottishness and Scottish independence.  I turn to the work of the social 
anthropologist Georgie Wemyss (2009) to consider the hidden significance of not 
naming ‘Britishness’ a form of nationalism.  She calls Britain and the values claimed in 
its name ‘the invisible empire,’ an insidious contemporary discourse that continues to 
legitimate and render natural a racialised and class-based national identity.  This 
produces effects, for Scottish nationalists as well as English nationalists, and others.  
Drawing on my own biography, the final section of this article considers how this 
realization generated personal consequences for me, in terms of how I felt about 
belonging and identity.  I conclude with some tentative suggestions for how sociologists 
and other social scientists might explore the politics of identity and nationalism in the 
UK today, including those committed to the sub-discipline of the Anthropology of 
Britain. 
 
 
After the referendum: an ethnographic encounter 
On 18 September 2014, Scotland held a referendum on whether or not to stay within the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  Both the Conservative-led UK 
Government in London and the Scottish National Party (SNP) Government in 
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Edinburgh had agreed to recognize the referendum result and consider it legally 
binding.  The rival campaigns, respectively to vote ‘Yes’ on the question of Scottish 
independence, or ‘No’ in support of the proposition that Scotland is ‘Better Together’ 
with England and the other constituent nations of the UK, had lasted two years. Turnout 
was unprecedented, with almost 85% of the electorate casting a ballot.  With record 
participation, the result was a clear win for ‘No’ campaigners.  2,001,926 voters – or 
55.3% of all ballots cast – rejected separation from the UK.  Yet, support for ‘Yes’ was 
strong, with a substantial minority of 1,617,989 – 44.7% of all electors who voted – 
backing independence for Scotland. (1) 
Two days after the referendum, I sat in a quiet corner of The Robert the Bruce, a 
Wetherspoons pub in Dumfries.  My mood remained pensive and unsettled.  My father-
in-law had just bought the first round of drinks.  I had not seen much of him, a Labour 
councilor, in the preceding months and he looked exhausted.  Like others form his 
party, he had been campaigning relentlessly against a prospective ‘Yes’ victory in the 
referendum, his wife joining him while canvassing for both the ‘Better Together’ and 
‘United with Labour’ campaigns.  Having only just removed the ‘No, Thanks’ poster 
from the front window of his living room that weekend, I was not sure if he wanted to 
catch up or debrief. 
We had barely touched our drinks before he told me of his relief that the 
referendum was over.  It had been a ‘distraction,’ he said, ‘divisive,’ splitting families 
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and neighbours.  The question of whether Scotland should remain part of the UK was 
now settled, he explained.  With the referendum over, my father-in-law felt he and his 
political colleagues could finally get on with the day-to-day business of administering 
Dumfries and Galloway Council after months of indecision and political hiatus.   
There was a pause, more awkward than I expected.  I asked the inevitable 
question.  ‘Now that the Labour Party hasn’t got the referendum to distract it, what is it 
going to do?’ I said.  ‘What do you want to achieve that you couldn’t get done before?’ 
My father-in-law drank slowly.  He was being cautious now, picking his words 
carefully.  The challenges ahead would be difficult, he said.  Scottish Government 
funding for Council-run services was being cut.  The ‘freeze’ on Council Tax, a popular 
policy of the SNP Government, had now been in place for several years and was 
preventing local governments across Scotland from raising revenues in line with 
inflation.  This was compounding the ‘squeeze’ on the local government finances.  £30 
million worth of ‘savings’ – roughly 10% of Dumfries and Galloway Council’s budget 
– had to be found over the next three years. 
‘So we are going to need to consult with local people about where to make the 
cuts,’ my father-in-law said.  ‘That’s all local government will be about from now until 
the next Council election [in 2017].  People will have to be told they can’t have all the 
services they want and they will have to be told why.  They then need to tell us what to 
protect.  People want their bins emptied on time, same time every week.  They want 
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potholes fixed and roads maintained.  That’s what’s important to most people.  You 
may care about libraries and museums and the arts and other things but those services 
are secondary.  We have to protect the ‘front line.’  The truth is, there is no vision out 
there, not from politicians in Edinburgh or Westminster, and we can’t provide it.  We’re 
just going to have to consult with local people and make cuts to local services.’ 
My father-in-law took a sip from his pint.  I was cautious now too, willing 
myself to choose my words carefully.  
‘What do you think?’ he said.   
I felt like I was being tested.  I knew what I wanted to say.  It had played over in 
my mind as I had endured his short monologue about budget cuts and what he saw as 
the poverty of imagination in our political leaders.  Then, the words tumbled from my 
mouth. 
‘I think that what you just said was a strong argument for voting ‘Yes’ in the 
referendum.’   
The resulting look on the face of my father-in-law told me that the promise of a 
pleasant couple of hours spent in the pub had now been thrown into jeopardy.   
I could not understand why I was in a provocative mood.  It was true that I had 
voted ‘Yes’ in the referendum but I had regarded myself an undecided voter throughout 
most of the two years of the campaign.  My views on Scottish independence were, at 
root, or so I thought, agnostic.  I also believed that I had been considering the arguments 
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for, and against, independence as matters of the head, certainly not the heart.  Now, I 
realized I had been kidding myself.  Why did I feel so strongly about the outcome of the 
referendum, and why were my feelings manifesting themselves now?  
Most people I know probably assumed I supported the idea that Scotland was 
‘Better Together’ in a political union with England, Wales and Northern Ireland.  
During the campaign, prominent ‘No’ activists stopped me in the High Street and 
swapped stories, as if they were sharing confidences with a fellow political traveller.  A 
prominent ‘Yes’ activist on the community council told me he thought I would vote 
‘No’ to Scottish independence; he was delighted when he learned of my late defection.  
In addition, my wife told me that during the summer of 2014 she had argued with her 
mother and said we were both considering voting ‘Yes’ in the referendum.  My mother-
in-law had been appalled. ‘Surely Alex would never vote for the Nationalists!’  
 If my mother-in-law was confused by the possibility of my voting ‘Yes,’ I was 
just as puzzled.  If asked before the referendum, I would have described myself as 
‘British.’  Such an identity seemed inclusive to me, particularly in terms of my 
biographical history.  While I have lived in Scotland since 1999, I work at an English 
University.  Furthermore, given that I was born and raised in Australia, I neither thought 
of myself as English or Scottish.  The argument I had with my father-in-law in the 
aftermath of the referendum provoked me to reflect long and hard on why I had grown 
disenchanted with my former identity as ‘British’ or ‘Australian-British’ (or ‘British-
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Australian’).  Before exploring the reasons for this, I will provide an overview of some 
of the important political events that took place during the campaign.  This will then 
allow me to consider the critiques of ‘narrow nationalism’ from opponents of Scottish 
independence, many of whom embraced an alternative, ‘British’ identity.  I will suggest 
that this identity, set up in contrast with the presumed ‘nationalism’ of pro-
independence activists, was often articulated as benign, inclusive and natural.  I will 
then go on to argue that this presentation of Britishness warrants closer scrutiny, 
empowering as it does a narrative that the social anthropologist Georgie Wemyss has 
called ‘the invisible empire’ (Wemyss, 2009).  What was being argued over was, in 
short, a struggle between two versions of nationalism.  The clearest of these was the 
Scottish version, which was described at various times as civic or ethnic, as I will 
discuss below.  The other was British and I suggest that in its contemporary form this is 
an example – or rather, an echo or memory – of an imperial nationalism.  This second, 
British version, I suggest, is rarely challenged or examined as, itself, a form of 
nationalist commitment. 
 
What happened in Scotland 
Immediately following the referendum, political leaders opposed to Scottish 
independence moved quickly to claim victory.  The morning after, the UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron spoke on behalf of those who had campaigned for ‘Better 
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Together.’  Describing the result as ‘clear’ and ‘settled for a generation,’ he asserted that 
‘there can be no disputes, no re-runs’ before stating that the three pro-Union parties 
were committed to ‘hearing’ the voices of the 1.6 million Scots who had voted to leave 
the UK.  He then announced that Lord Smith of Kelvin would take charge of a process 
for agreeing new constitutional powers for the Scottish Parliament, on tax, spending and 
welfare.  In the hours that followed, senior Labour politicians like former Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown endorsed David Cameron’s comments and re-committed to 
extending new powers to the Scottish Parliament. 
 Events also moved swiftly for the vanquished.  Before the day was over, Scottish 
First Minister Alex Salmond resigned.  His Deputy, Nicola Sturgeon, took over as 
interim leader.  Weeks later, she was elected unopposed, as both leader of the SNP and 
First Minister of Scotland.   
 The result also generated problems for the Scottish Labour Party, which had lost 
almost 200,000 of its own voters to the ‘Yes’ camp.  Johann Lamont, the party’s leader, 
resigned within days of the referendum, arguing that the UK Labour Party ran its affairs 
in Scotland as if the latter was ‘a branch office’ of London Labour.  A leadership 
contest ensued, with Jim Murphy – a Scottish Member of Parliament (MP) who had 
served in the Cabinet under Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown – defeating 
Neil Findlay, a Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) from the Left.  Campaigning 
against a ‘Yes’ vote, Murphy had visited 100 towns and cities before the referendum.  
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Unlike many of his Labour colleagues, he claimed during media interviews that he had 
‘relished’ the debate.  With less than five months to go before the UK General Election 
of May 2015, Murphy now sought to throw himself into the electoral fight to come.  
 Despite losing the referendum, the SNP appeared empowered by the result.  
100,000 people joined the party, quadrupling its membership.  Opinion polling clearly 
suggested one in two Scottish voters now intended to support them at the General 
Election.  Alex Salmond announced he would stand as a candidate in the forthcoming 
Westminster elections.  The SNP hastily held candidate selections across the country.  
With his party now on a war footing, Jim Murphy tried to pull rank with Labour voters, 
predicting a vote for the SNP would only let the Tories get back into power ‘through the 
back door.’  
 Opinion polling continued to point to an overwhelming victory for the Scottish 
Nationalists.  Still, the worst-case scenario – in which all Labour seats would be lost to 
the SNP – still seemed unlikely.  Labour activists in Dumfries spoke earnestly of the 
need to have faith in the Smith Commission and ‘delivering the change Scotland needs,’ 
in so doing pegging prospective SNP gains in the General Election to a tally in the 
teens.  ‘The only sure way of keeping the Tories out of power is to vote for a Labour 
government,’ several of them told me, a mantra repeated constantly on Labour’s 
promotional material in the final weeks of the campaign.  
 It turned out, for once, that the opinion polling was close to the mark.  On what 
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was a cataclysmic night politically for the Labour Party – which lost the UK-wide poll – 
the SNP won 56 of the 59 Westminster Parliamentary seats in Scotland.  Scottish 
Labour was reduced from 42 seats to one.  This was the same number held by the 
Conservatives in Scotland, the sum total of the latter’s efforts to claw back support after 
their infamous electoral ‘wipe out’ in 1997 (cf. Seawright, 1999; Smith, 2011).  The 
Scottish Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, saw their cohort of ten Members of Parliament 
also cut to just one.  The three incumbent pro-UK MPs who held their seats did so with 
margins of less than 1000 votes over their respective, second-placed SNP challengers.  
 The sudden collapse of support for the Labour Party in Scotland alongside the 
dramatic rise in backing for the SNP in a First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) Westminster 
election was unprecedented and, certainly, unexpected prior to the 2014 referendum on 
Scottish independence.  Not even the destruction of the Scottish Conservatives at the 
1997 General Election comes close as a comparison to the spectacle of the Labour 
Party’s rout in Scotland in 2015.  No one would have predicted such an outcome in May 
2012, when the date of the referendum was announced.  In June 2012, I published a 
Blogpost for Manchester University Press called ‘Battle Now Joined for Scotland’s 
Constitutional Future’ in which I wrote: 
 
‘It is certainly true that the challenges ahead for the Scottish Nationalists in 
winning the referendum campaign should not be underestimated.  The latest 
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opinion polling suggests that, after recently peaking at just shy of 40%, support 
for independence has now dropped to 35% amongst Scottish voters.  With 55% 
of the electorate behind them, those opposed to independence remain in the 
majority.  These figures reinforce a pattern, which has remained consistent since 
the opening of the Scottish Parliament over a decade ago, that demonstrates no 
more than about a third of Scots support independence.’  
 
At the time of making these observations, I did not consider them controversial or 
prescient.  They were clearly supported by the anthropological and sociological 
literature documenting the ebbs and flows of Scottish nationalism since the early 1970s 
(e.g. Hearn, 2000; McCrone, 1992).  However, in light of ‘Yes’ achieving 45% of the 
vote in the referendum, that a much-smaller number of Scots historically supported 
independence until 2014 is a fact that has now become redundant.  Re-reading the 
Blogpost after the referendum, it struck me as remarkable that during the two years of 
campaigning that followed its publication, support for the ‘Better Together’ campaign 
remained unchanged.  Put simply, it would appear that ‘Better Together’ failed to grow 
the ‘No’ vote beyond the 55% of Scots who seem to have backed their cause from the 
beginning.   
Over 15% of the electorate, in June 2012, had been open-minded or undecided 
on the question of whether Scotland should remain within the UK.  If most of these 
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voters had ended up deciding to back Scottish independence, this was a political 
surprise for strategists and pundits on both sides of the debate.  Conventional political 
wisdom would normally dictate that undecided voters are instinctively cautious and will 
usually agree to support the status quo than vote for radical change.  ‘Convincing 
sceptical voters to take a leap into the constitutional dark and back independence 
remains a massive mountain for the SNP to climb between now and the 2014 
referendum,’ I had written in that same Blogpost. 
 The constitutional future of Scotland might therefore seem less certain than the 
apparent ‘decisiveness’ (to paraphrase David Cameron) of the referendum result itself.  
This unsettled state of affairs is all the more surprising when placed in a longer 
historical trajectory.  Over fifteen years ago, when the Scottish Parliament opened on 1 
July 1999 following a successful referendum on devolution held during the first years of 
the Blair Government, the political consensus at Westminster was that devolution would 
kill off the cause of Scottish nationalism for a generation or more.  Prime Minister Tony 
Blair said that devolution would ‘cement’ the union echoing comments from 1995 when 
his colleague George (later Lord) Robertson, then Shadow Secretary of State for 
Scotland, proclaimed that ‘devolution would kill nationalism stone dead’ (quoted in 
Warner, 2007). In addition, many also thought that the Proportional Representation 
(PR) voting system adopted for Scottish Parliament elections would prevent the Scottish 
Nationalists – or indeed any other political party – ever securing an outright majority at 
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Holyrood.  As the recipient of the most votes and therefore seats in Scotland, the Labour 
Party anticipated several Scottish Parliamentary terms in administration, albeit with the 
Liberal Democrats as junior partners in coalition government.  As it turned out, the 
Labour-Liberal Democrat Scottish Executive lasted two terms before the SNP won 
more seats than other parties in 2007.  They ran a minority administration before 
securing an outright majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament in 2011. 
 It is evident much has changed in Scotland over the last two decades.  However, 
the reasons why different people voted ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the 2014 referendum are varied 
and complex.  Much of the political analysis, of the referendum results as well as the 
Labour Party’s wipeout in Scotland at the 2015 General Election, has focused on the 
emergence of a new partisanship in Scotland, which posits a commitment to nation or 
national identity.  This now trumps old class-based loyalties, so the argument goes, on 
which the Labour Party traded for the last half-century (McCrone 1992, Hassan and 
Warhurst, 2002).   
I suspect there is validity in this argument.  However, it is worth asking, in light 
of the fact that a majority of Scots voted to stay in the UK, just to which ‘nation’ people 
north of the English-Scottish border believe themselves to belong?  I hope, in the 
remainder of this article, to demonstrate that it would be overly simplistic to equate 
‘Yes’ voters with a commitment to Scottish Nationalism without paying sufficient heed 
to the question of whether many ‘No’ voters themselves are somehow invested, 
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culturally and emotionally, in a commitment to what I will call British Nationalism.  I 
do this deliberately.  Unlike its Scottish counterpart, Britishness is rarely examined in 
the popular media as an example of nationalism.  This has important cultural, political 
and social consequences, not just for constitutional politics in the UK but also for how 
social anthropologists, sociologists and others seek to apprehend ‘Britain’ as an 
analytical object.   
 
Scottish nationalism: a contested view 
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, nationalism re-
emerged as a social force in Central and Eastern Europe as well as an object of study for 
both social anthropologists and sociologists.  Building on the canonical work of earlier 
scholars like Benedict Anderson (1983), Ernest Gellner (2006 [1983]) and Eric 
Hobsbawm (1990), anthropological and sociological research was pursued during the 
1990s against a backdrop of ethnic violence, in Africa, Asia and the former Yugoslavia, 
as ‘old’ states broke up and new (or sometimes newly-imagined) but previously-
stateless nations sought to assert themselves.  For many, the scale and brutality of the 
genocides in the Balkans and in Rwanda seemed an unwelcome reminder of the legacies 
of fascism and Nazism in Europe as well as imperialism in Africa.  The re-emergence of 
older, seemingly ‘primordial’ ties to ‘nationhood’ and the nation-state struck many 
scholars as a problem to be solved, a problem especially perplexing at the very moment 
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when globalization was extending its reach and intensifying its grip on the former 
Soviet republics and countries of the old Communist Bloc.  If the world was to avoid 
the destructive spiral of sectarian violence that haunted the first half of the twentieth 
century, nationalism was viewed as a reactionary ideology – a pathology, even – that 
needed to be challenged in the service of building a contemporary, inclusive, 
cosmopolitan polity.  
 One important scholarly debate that ensued focused on a controversial question: 
is it possible to find forms of nationalism that are not underpinned by, and in turn 
legitimate, racist or sectarian identities that might lead to worse: ethnically based, 
genocidal violence?  Or must all forms of nationalism be written off because of several 
well-publicized accounts of murderous, ethnic nationalism?   
In his 1995 book ‘Banal Nationalism,’ the social psychologist Michael Billig 
argued that even when national identity is registered at its most banal – such as through 
the following of football teams, the saluting of flags and the singing of national anthems 
– a country’s people is subconsciously ‘primed’ to support heinous acts their leaders 
may wish to carry out in the name of their nation.  Not all social anthropologists and 
sociologists agree with this view of nationalism.  Some have distinguished between 
examples of ethnic nationalism, a pernicious ideology fueling sectarian hatreds and 
inspiring violence and mass murder, and more civic forms of nationalism, grounded in 
shared values and cultural institutions.  For example, Quebecois nationalists abandoned 
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political violence in the 1970s, instead embracing the ballot box as their preferred 
instrument for advancing their cause for secession from the Canadian state.  This lead to 
Quebecois nationalism being reimagined as an examplar of civic nationalism, an 
argument for self-government for a people distinguished by their own language and 
what the anthropologist Richard Handler once described as a ‘politics of culture’ (1988) 
rather than a separate, ethnic identity.  
 In Western Europe, Scottish Nationalism – along with the Catalans in Spain as 
well as their fellow Welsh in the UK – sparked scholarly attention in debates over 
whether the SNP represented traditions of civic nationalism (cf. Alter, 1985: 99-103; 
Brand, 1990; Cohen, 1996, 1999; Guibernau, 1996: 101; Hearn, 2000; Henderson, 
2001; Kellas, 1992; Lynch, 1996; Nairn, 1997). Former First Minister Alex Salmond is 
widely credited as having led the party away from older forms of what might be 
described as an ethnic nationalism grounded in a romantic sense of Scottish identity and 
a hostility to Englishness (Macwhirter, 2014, Torrance, 2014).  Under his leadership, 
from the 1990s onwards, Mr. Salmond sought to present national identity in Scotland as 
based on shared political values and a sense of community, rather than ethnicity or 
history.  Writing in an American newspaper in 2012, Mr. Salmond said: 
 
‘In a process of self-government that has taken the best part of the last century, 
not one person has ever died arguing for or against Scottish independence.  The 
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national movement in Scotland is peaceful, democratic and civic in its nature – 
something perhaps, in this troubled world, to be encouraged …’ (The 
Washington Post, 7 December 2012) 
 
Others in the SNP endorsed his view, with the Cabinet Secretary for Culture and 
External Affairs Fiona Hyslop arguing the SNP represents a ‘grand, progressive civic 
nationalism’ at their 2012 Party Conference.  Salmond’s rendering of Scottish 
nationalism has also found support amongst some academics, Bloggers and journalists 
(cf. Devine, 1999, Green, 2014, Macwhirter, 2014). 
However, categorizing Scottish nationalism in this way has not been without 
controversy.  In a passionate, pro-Union speech on the eve of the referendum, former 
UK Prime Minster Gordon Brown urged Scots not to allow ‘narrow nationalism’ to 
‘split asunder’ what England and Scotland and the other constituent nations of the UK 
‘have built together.’  In April 2014, the journalist David Torrance – a supporter of 
‘Better Together’ – wrote: 
 
‘… [In] reality modern Scottish Nationalism is neither wholly ethnic nor wholly 
civic, but rather a mixture of the two. This is clear to anyone who regularly 
attends Nationalist gatherings. Although conferences are tamer affairs (they 
often resembled clan gatherings in the 1970s), last September's pro-
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independence rally on Calton Hill was ostentatiously ethnic, with a plethora of 
kilts, face paint, frayed banners and unsavoury characters from fringe European 
secessionist movements…’ (Sunday Herald, 13 April 2014) 
 
Similarly, several academics have argued that Scottish nationalism incorporates ethnic 
as well as civic elements (e.g. Jackson, 2014, Mycock, 2012).  Meanwhile, during the 
referendum campaign itself, many Bloggers attacked SNP activists and ‘Yes’ supporters 
who had promoted anti-English views that, in their view, displayed a commitment to 
‘ethnic’ nationalism.  For example, in a post called ‘“Civic” nationalism?  Yeah right,’ 
one Blogger listed Tweets and other comments taken from social media that 
demonstrated a dislike – or what he called ‘hatred’ – towards the English.  In his view, 
this betrayed the ethnic/sectarian roots of Scottish nationalism. 
 Given the troubled legacy of nationalism, from the early twentieth century 
onwards, it is understandable that attempts to define Scottish nationalism as either 
‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ would be contested.  My purpose here is not to take a view that 
Scottish nationalism takes one form or the other.  Rather, I want to make the point that 
academic debates about nationalism are echoed in political and media debates beyond 
the academy and that these debates produce political effects.  For Alex Salmond and the 
‘Yes’ campaign, it was of potential electoral consequence if voters viewed Scottish 
nationalism as fundamentally ‘civic’ – and therefore inclusive – in its composition.  For 
Chapter	3	
 
those opposed to the SNP, it was important to challenge such a view, to frame 
nationalism in Scotland as ‘ethnically’ Scottish and exclusive.  However, I want to now 
argue that the struggle that took place in Scotland during the 2014 referendum was, in 
part, between two kinds of nationalism.  Whereas what defines Scottish nationalism – 
institutionally as well as in substance – was widely debated, that other nationalism went 
largely unexamined.  That ‘nationalism’ is British.  I will suggest that claims about 
‘Britishness’ and what it means to belong to ‘Britain’ should have rightly been 
subjected to the same scholarly and media scrutiny to that which has applied to Scottish 
nationalism.  Despite attempts by a handful of pro-independence Bloggers, SNP 
supporters and figures on the radical English Left like Billy Bragg (2014), a critique of 
British Nationalism did not gain purchase in the mainstream media.  Following the 
social anthropologist Georgie Wemyss (2009), I suggest that this is because Britain 
Nationalism is invisible.  Claims made by advocates for Britain and British identity 
disguise Britishness itself as a form of nationalist commitment.  Like Scottish 
Nationalism, it combines ethnic and civic elements.  To illustrate, and remembering my 
earlier ethnographic encounter after the 2014 referendum, I return to my own personal 
biography.    
 
The ‘Invisible Empire’ 
As I stated earlier, I gravitated towards the cause of ‘Better Together’ at the beginning 
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of the referendum campaign.  I believe this was because I thought of myself, 
fundamentally, as ‘British.’  Although I am a sixth generation Australian, I regard my 
family as being Anglophile in socio-cultural outlook.  My ancestry is overwhelmingly 
Cornish, with strong traditions of Methodism and Anglicanism.  My parents and 
grandparents viewed the cultural institutions of Britain – the BBC and its universities, 
especially – as superior to those of Australia.  The secondary school I attended, which 
was fee-paying, styled itself as an Antipodean version of a prestigious English grammar 
school.  My maternal grandmother ran an upmarket gift shop in the leafy eastern 
suburbs of Adelaide specializing in importing goods from Britain; her shop did a 
roaring trade around the Royal Wedding in 1983.  In all the major debates about 
Australia’s constitutional future and national identity, my family sided firmly with the 
Queen and the ‘mother country,’ as my grandmother called Britain. 
 It could be argued that even before I came to the UK, I had been educated and 
culturally immersed within British traditions and values.  Instinctively, I recognized the 
version of ‘Britishness’ that Prime Minister David Cameron articulated when he spoke 
at the 2008 Scottish Conservative Party conference in Ayr: 
 
‘Being British is one of the most successful examples of inclusive civic 
nationalism in the world.  We can be a shining example of what a multi-ethnic, 
multi-faith, multi-national society can and should be.’ (BBC News Online, 23 
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May 2008) 
 
Apart from the fact that David Cameron’s speech included a rare acknowledgement that 
being British constitutes a nationalist commitment in itself, his claim of what it means 
to be British is controversial.  It was certainly not the view of British Nationalism 
shared by SNP activists and supporters.  When she asserted that the SNP represented 
‘grand progressive civic nationalism,’ Fiona Hyslop MSP described British nationalism 
as ‘narrow, chippy and hostile,’ citing examples in support of her claim including 
skepticism towards membership of the European Union and a ‘national myth of military 
power’ (cf. Taylor 2012).  However, despite the critique of Hyslop and a few other 
supporters of independence, I have little recollection of British Nationalism being 
subjected to the same level of scrutiny and challenge as its Scottish counterpart.  
Importantly, such claims are political and, in the context of the independence 
referendum, produced political effects.   
 As the ‘Better Together’ and ‘Yes’ campaigns were both launched following the 
2012 Scottish local government elections, I published the post I mentioned above on the 
Manchester University Press Blog.  I wrote, with a sense of personal optimism, that 
‘[while] it is likely that a focus on the negative consequences and practical uncertainties 
of independence may help ‘No’ campaigners win the referendum, it is also true that they 
need to make an equally positive case for Scotland remaining within the United 
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Kingdom.’  In other words, this was an opportunity to make a positive case for 
belonging to Britain. Late in the campaign, opinion polling suggested many undecided 
Scottish voters disliked what they perceived to be an overly negative campaign from 
‘Better Together.’  Even later – and some worried too late at the time – several leading 
Unionists attempted to make the positive argument for Britain.  Perhaps the most 
notable of these was former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown.  When in 
government, in 2007, he had put forward controversial proposals to celebrate 
Britishness and British values.  In a speech to the Commonwealth Club on 27 February 
2007, he said: 
 
‘[When] people are also asked what they admire about Britain, more usually it is 
our values: British tolerance, the British belief in liberty and the British sense of 
fair play. Even before America said in its constitution it was the land of liberty 
and erected the Statue of Liberty, I think Britain can lay claim to the idea of 
liberty.  Out of the necessity of finding a way to live together in a multinational 
state came the practice of tolerance, then the pursuit of liberty and the principle 
of fairness to all.  Indeed Britain is a country that not only prides itself in its 
fairness, tolerance and what George Orwell called decency but … wants to be 
defined by it, defined by being a tolerant, fair and decent country.’ 
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Certainly, my Anglophile relatives in Australia would have embraced this view of 
Britain.  Gordon Brown’s claim that ‘it was in the name of liberty that in the 1800s 
Britain led the world in abolishing the slave trade’ and that ‘so too, in the 1940s, in the 
name of liberty, Britain stood firm against fascism’ would have been celebrated by my 
grandparents in particular.   
However, as several social anthropologists and sociologists building on the work 
of Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy and others have argued, this representation of Britain and 
British values itself suffers from an historical amnesia (cf. Tyler, 2012; Wemyss, 2009).  
Not once in his speech did Gordon Brown mention the British Empire, and it is very 
much within the context of being part of that empire that my grandparents would have 
celebrated and taken pride in what he claimed to be Britain’s achievements and values.  
As Georgie Wemyss has argued, what I am calling here British Nationalism is 
empowered by the invisibility of the empire that had been built in Britain’s name: 
 
‘In varying levels of sophistication, the discourse [of the ‘Invisible Empire’] 
consistently asserts particular narratives of Britain’s past whilst suppressing 
alternative histories, especially about the British Empire and related histories of 
white violence. When it does acknowledge the British Empire, it is a discourse 
of merchants and the spread of civilization that suffocates competing memories’ 
(Wemyss, 2009: 3)   
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Omitting mention of the British Empire from the former Prime Minister’s speech is 
important because the ‘invisible empire’ contributes to the empowering of ‘dominant 
white discourse, asserting positive narratives about Britain’s colonial past and obscuring 
contesting histories’ (Wemyss, 2009: 12).  This helps privilege, and contributes to the 
naturalization of, white experience, ‘making the white subject invisible by normalizing 
it’ (Wemyss, 2009: 13). 
Not only is Britain, together with its invisible empire, imagined in these terms as 
‘white.’  It also lends itself to a particular rendering of Englishness, which Katharine 
Tyler has unpacked in terms of its constructions of both class and race (Tyler 2012).  In 
Scotland, though, this version of British Nationalism eclipses Englishness as a category 
to which many who live north of the England-Scotland border might consider 
themselves belonging.  After all, it makes little sense to be an English Nationalist in 
Scotland.  For this reason, I began the referendum campaign imagining myself as 
British, though I recognize the constructs both Tyler and Wemyss explore in the kind of 
upbringing I enjoyed as a child in Australia.  It was when I acknowledged this, in the 
context of debates over Scottish independence, I began to question my belief that I 
belonged to a place called ‘Britain’ (albeit having originated from Australia).  I became 
disenchanted with the idea of Britishness.  This opened up intellectual and emotional 
space that rendered me available to becoming a ‘Yes’ convert in the 2014 referendum.  
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For me, the final nail in the coffin of my commitment to Britain – the moment 
my disenchantment with Britishness achieved completion – came when George 
Galloway, the maverick MP for Bradford West, toured Scotland to argue against 
Scottish independence and promote a new book.  ‘When Hitler was standing at the 
Channel Ports, when the RAF was fighting the Luftwaffe, no one cared if a pilot was 
from Sutherland or Southwark,’ he said at a hustings in Portobello.  As Britain stood 
alone against Nazi Germany, Galloway claimed, ‘leaders of the SNP were interned.  
They were collaborating with Hitler seeking to open channels with him to let him into 
this island’ (Hassan 2014). In my view, this statement was not only ludicrous. It was 
also dismissive of the importance of the British Empire – rendered here invisible – in 
sustaining the ‘mother country’ in its war against Germany. I had grown up with stories 
of the sacrifices made by Australians and other Commonwealth citizens to Britain’s war 
effort. These were foundational to my grandparents’ mythology of themselves, as 
British subjects. It was as if the contributions of veterans like my maternal grandfather, 
who had come to Britain as an RAAF pilot and flown for Bomber Command in 1944-
45, had now been airbrushed from history, along with the rest of the British Empire. No 
one may have cared if a pilot was from Sutherland or Southwark; nor did they care if 
they came from Saskatchewan or South Australia.  
 
Relocating the British subject 
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When former Prime Minister Gordon Brown spoke on the eve of the Scottish 
referendum, it was hailed as one of the most important speeches of his political career.  
Drawing on arguments he articulated the year before in his book ‘My Scotland, Our 
Britain: A Future Worth Sharing,’ he said that ‘[the] vote tomorrow is not about 
whether Scotland is a nation – we are, yesterday, today and tomorrow’:   
 
‘It’s not about whether there is a Scottish Parliament – we have it.  It’s not about 
whether there are increased powers, we are all agreed to increase the powers … 
The vote tomorrow is whether you want to break and sever every link, and I say 
let’s keep our UK pensions, let’s keep our UK pound, let’s keep our UK 
passports, let’s keep our UK welfare state.’ 
 
Britain – now emphasized as the UK – had fought and won wars, Mr. Brown said.  It 
had ‘built the peace together’ as well as established the NHS and the welfare state.  It is 
telling, however, that in his speech Gordon Brown differentiates Scotland from the 
UK/Britain, the latter being something else: ‘a multinational state.’  What kind of 
multinational state?  There was no mention, of course, of that other history, ‘built 
together’ by its constituent nations in the name of Britain: the (invisible) Empire. 
The absence of Britain’s imperial history from such declarations of what Britain 
is and what Britishness represents speaks volumes about the tensions that are core to 
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renderings of British identity today.  These tensions have political consequences for 
how we conceive of both community and constitution within, what still remains, the 
United Kingdom. They point to new opportunities for social anthropologists, 
sociologists and others to reconsider their subject of study or, to put it another way, to 
relocate the British subject. 
1.6 million Scots voted for independence from the UK.  It seems reasonable to 
speculate that the majority of these people imagine themselves belonging to a political 
community other than Britain.  Yet, they were unsuccessful in securing through the 
ballot box an independent Scotland so they remain within the boundaries of the political 
community that the UK constitutes.  There is a tension here, then.  Is it plausible to 
ascribe to those who identify themselves as Scottish Nationalists the label British?  For 
social anthropologists, sociologists and others, is Britain good to think with?  As the 
Scottish independence referendum demonstrated, there are significant (minority) 
populations living within the borders of the UK who may now no longer identify 
themselves as ‘British,’ if they did before.  To frame social anthropological or 
sociological analyses of Scots, Welsh, Irish or even English communities as studies of 
the ‘British’ risks unintentionally reinforcing identity claims that have consequences for 
politics and community.  Such work must proceed reflexively and attend to themes of 
the post-imperial (British) imagination if we, as scholars, are to avoid uncritically 
endorsing renderings of Britain like that which former Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
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articulated or which draw power on a misplaced nostalgia for a lost, imperial past. 
It would be more accurate, then, to put Britain forward as both a field site in the 
anthropological tradition but also a ‘sight’ within the sociological and wider public 
imagination.  It is not simply a site to know but a site of knowledge that, itself, helps 
powerfully shape the conditions by which it is known.  I am arguing for the de-
territorialising of both anthropological and sociological studies of ‘Britain,’ 
‘Britishness’ and British identity.  Britain exerts a presence in the imaginations of 
Commonwealth migrants, former settler populations and the colonized peoples of the 
former empire that, while remaining invisible in many contemporary political narratives 
of what it means to be British, nonetheless empowers the idea of Britain today.  Put 
simply, if some within the UK no longer identify as British, it is equally true that around 
the world, ‘subjects’ like my grandparents might have justifiably claimed a belonging to 
Britain.  Indeed, when I opened my grandfather’s enlistment papers from the Second 
World War, now housed in the National Archives of Australia, I was surprised to read 
that his nationality was labeled ‘British’ even though he had been born in Australia (as 
had his parents).  How such an identity had been constituted, historically, was through a 
dialectic between British subjects here and British subjects ‘out there’ – ‘Down Under,’ 
‘Across the Pond,’ in former colonial possessions, in Africa, South Asia and the West 
Indies.  Britain and Britishness need to be unpacked and explored, their consequences 
and political effects accounted for and taken seriously.   
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At best, as a ‘place,’ Britain and Britishness are ideologically contested.  As a 
constitutional ‘space,’ following the Scottish independence referendum, it certainly 
remains unsettled.  The debate over Scotland’s place in Britain – if the latter remains a 
meaningful ‘place’ to speak of – continues.  On 23 June 2016, the UK held a 
referendum on whether or not to remain a member of the European Union (EU).  A 
narrow majority (51.9%) voted to ‘leave.’  While uneven across the country, support for 
staying in the EU was particularly high in London (59.9%), Northern Ireland (55.8%) 
and Scotland (62%), where every single Local Authority voted to ‘remain’ in the EU.  
In contrast to the strident tone taken by Theresa May’s Conservative Government at 
Westminster, which has prioritized securing border and immigration controls during 
Brexit negotiations, the SNP Government favours staying in the European single 
market.  Whether this is possible while Scotland stays part of the UK seems unlikely.  
For this reason, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has suggested that leaving the single 
market ‘undoubtedly’ brings a second referendum on Scottish independence closer.  
The political stakes are high, though.  It is not certain that, following Brexit, the SNP 
will succeed in converting enough former ‘No’ voters to their cause in a second 
referendum on Scottish independence.  Scotland appears divided as ever and there is 
bitterness, still, on both sides.   
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Notes 
(1) National and international media organizations extensively covered the referendum 
on Scottish independence.  My primary source of the electoral data quoted here is the 
BBC (cf. http://www.bbc.com/news/events/scotland-decides/results)  
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